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Abstract: 
We estimate monetary policy rules for six central and eastern European countries (CEEC) 
during the period when they prepared for membership to the EU and monetary union. By 
taking changes in the policy settings explicitly into account and by splitting up the exchange 
rate impact into two different components we significantly improve estimation results for 
monetary policy rules in CEEC. We uncover that the focus of the interest rate setting 
behaviour in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland explicitly switched from defending the 
peg to targeting inflation. For Slovakia, however, there still seemed to be on ongoing focus on 
the exchange rate. Finally, Slovenia and, after a policy switch, Romania exhibit a solid 
relation with inflation as well.   
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Monetary Policy Rules in Central and Eastern European 
Countries: Does the Exchange Rate Matter? 
 
1. Introduction  
Monetary policy in Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) has drawn 
increasing attention from academics and practitioners. While preparing for membership to the 
EU and monetary union, the central banks in CEEC were challenged by high inflation in the 
earlier periods, and then managed to disinflate fairly successfully. The way this was achieved, 
however, was considerably different: The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia 
focused on exchange rate targeting during the first years, but then gradually made their 
exchange rate system more flexible and adopted inflation targeting as their monetary policy 
strategy. Romania and Slovenia never officially had a fixed exchange rate regime. While 
Romania adopted inflation targeting only in August 2005, Slovenia officially followed a 
monetary targeting strategy for most of the time before adopting a two-pillar-like strategy in 
the run-up to monetary union (for the official exchange rate and monetary policy regimes see 
Table 1 and 2).  
For these six countries, the interest rate setting behaviour of a central bank can provide 
important insights into the objectives which are most important in its conduct of monetary 
policy. A standard approach is to estimate a Taylor-like interest rate reaction function. While 
the empirical literature concludes that the monetary policy by most successful central banks in 
large industrial countries can be described by such a reaction function (Clarida et al. 1998), 
evidence for emerging economies and particularly transition economies is poor. 
Regime shifts, however, seem to matter. Kahn and Parrish (1998), for example, find that 
significant structural breaks in the monetary policy reaction function occurred, after New 
Zealand and the UK introduced inflation targeting. In both countries the significance of the 
exchange rate lost importance. Neumann and von Hagen (2002) disclose the same result for a 
larger country set. Assenmacher-Wesche (2006) estimates reaction functions with time-
varying coefficients for Germany, the United Kingdom and the US. These empirical results 
stress the importance of taking policy changes into account.  
Since CEEC are small open economies, one may argue that besides regime shifts also 
the exchange rate plays a major role in the reaction function. Ball (1999) argues that pure 
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inflation targeting without explicit attention to the exchange rate is dangerous in an open 
economy, because it creates large fluctuations in exchange rates and output. In this context, 
the effects of exchange rates on inflation through import prices is the fastest channel from 
monetary policy to inflation, therefore monetary policy cannot neglect it. The need for 
considering the exchange rate will be obvious, if the monetary authorities explicitly target the 
exchange rate, as they (initially) did in many CEEC. However, the way the exchange rate 
enters the reaction function should then be different, because monetary policy has to react on 
potential violations of the exchange rate band in order to keep it credible. Thus the reaction is 
non-linear, as it will get stronger, the closer the exchange rate approaches the intervention 
margins. It will also be non-discretionary, because the authorities are obliged to react, as long 
as they intent to sustain the peg. 
In line with e.g. Peersman and Smets (1999), our emphasis is on positive or descriptive 
rather than normative aspects of policy analysis. We investigate the role of the exchange rate 
by looking at the interest rate setting behaviour of the central bank and to which degree it has 
taken exchange rate developments into account. The paper thereby sheds some light on the 
discussion to which extent the interest setting behavior of these central banks complies with 
the “fear of floating” hypothesis, as analyzed by Calvo and Reinhart (2002). A central bank 
that changes interest rates systematically in response to inflation and also to exchange rate 
shocks is more likely to support evidence on this hypothesis, keeping in mind that the central 
bank nevertheless still may use interventions in the foreign exchange market as an instrument 
to steer the exchange rate.  
This paper adds to the literature in five ways: First, our analysis covers a longer sample 
period than most previous studies. We consider a substantial part of the transition period from 
January 1994 till August 2008. Second, whereas most works only include the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and sometimes Slovakia, we add Slovenia and Romania to the sample. Thus 
we consider all new EU member states in CEEC which one may assume to have pursued a 
more or less independent monetary policy during a considerable period of time1. Third, the 
analysis takes explicitly into account shifts in exchange rate and monetary policy regimes that 
have occurred in all the countries of the sample. Fourth, we introduce a non-linear measure of 
distance to the intervention margins to identify those interest rate changes that stem from the 
peg. To our knowledge we are the first taking this effect into account. Fifth, we apply the 
                                                 
1
 This is not the case for the remaining CEEC that joined EU: The Baltic states and Bulgaria followed very strict 
exchange rate regimes and partially currency boards. This means they could not pursue an independent monetary 
policy. 
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cointegration methodology to interest rate rules as suggested by Gerlach-Kristen (2003), 
which has rarely been applied to transition economies. These innovations allow us to retrieve 
more realistic coefficients from our reaction function, and thus our model better describes the 
interest rate setting behaviour of the monetary authorities. 
The paper proceeds as follows: The following section 2 reviews the research on interest 
rate rules in transition economies. Section 3 introduces our empirical approach and our 
distance measure. Section 4 describes the data and presents the empirical results, while 
section 5 summarizes and concludes. 
 
2. Monetary policy  rules in CEEC 
 Research on monetary policy rules in the context of emerging market economies and 
particularly transition economies is of more recent origin and relatively scarce. An important 
finding of Mohanty and Klau (2004) is that central banks in emerging market economies tend 
to look beyond inflation and focus on other objectives as well, most prominently on exchange 
rate changes.  
The amount of literature specifically on monetary policy rules in CEEC is limited, first 
because time series available are comparatively short. They usually start in the middle of the 
1990s. Second, most CEEC have not followed one single strategy of monetary policy and also 
gradually made their exchange rates more flexible (see Tables 1 and 2). Third, it is not quite 
clear which target values for inflation the CEEC followed, as most countries introduced 
inflation targeting and explicit inflation goals only between 1997 and 2001.  
Recently, there have been some attempts to describe the monetary policy in selected 
CEEC using interest rate rules. Maria-Dolores (2005) and Paez-Farell (2007), for example, 
estimate Taylor rules for the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. The latter finds 
that there is a reaction to exchange rate movements. Angeloni et al. (2007) set up interest rate 
rules for the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, introducing the US dollar interest rate as a 
proxy for inflationary pressures of global origin. Yilmazkuday (2008) and Jakab and Vilagi 
(2008) consider structural breaks in their estimates of monetary policy rules for CEECs. 
Moons and Van Poeck (2008) find that the accession countries do not differ substantially 
from the current EMU members with respect to the interest rate setting behavior, and that 
there has been increased convergence. Remo and Vasicek (2009) apply a DSGE model to 
Czech data and conclude that the focus of the Czech National Bank was mainly on inflation. 
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Finally, Horváth (2009) analyzes the policy neutral rate in the Czech Republic. The results 
indicate a substantial interest rate convergence to levels comparable to the euro area.  
Empirical research suggests that a Taylor-like rule is helpful in understanding monetary 
policy of the CEEC. However, in most cases inflation coefficients are found to be far below 
unity, thus violating the so-called Taylor principle. If the Taylor principle holds, the policy 
rate should move more than proportional with increases in the inflation rate and thereby raise 
the real interest rate. If the monetary policy rule violates the Taylor principle, it will mean that 
the central bank does not react adequately on bringing down inflation. This result is 
counterintuitive, as the CEEC have experienced a remarkable degree of disinflation during the 
last 15 years. The literature suggests mainly two explanations: Angeloni et al. (2007) argue 
that part of the reaction on inflation is captured by the coefficient on the US interest rate 
included in their equation. An increase in global inflation would then lead to a composed 
reaction, which is partly due to domestic inflation via the conventional inflation coefficient 
and partly due to foreign inflation via the coefficient on the foreign interest rate. One might 
similarly argue that the exchange rate included in the interest rate rule partially takes the 
reaction on inflation, as it anchors expectations on future monetary policy. Another argument, 
proposed by Golinelli and Rovelli (2005) is that the reaction to an increase in inflation may be 
modest, if the initial interest rate compared to inflation was set high enough. Thus a smaller 
coefficient means that in the course of the disinflation process monetary policy is getting even 
more aggressive. The scenario seems to be well applicable to the CEEC. However, one would 
at least expect the inflation coefficient to be close to unity during periods of autonomous 
monetary policy. 
Besides the above mentioned empirical research, the treatment of exchange rate changes 
in monetary policy rules is also discussed in the theoretical literature. Svensson (2000) 
compares strict inflation targeting, which implies a vigorous use of the direct exchange rate 
channel for stabilizing (CPI-) inflation at a short horizon, with flexible inflation targeting, 
which stabilizes inflation at a longer horizon, and thereby also stabilizes real exchange rates 
and other variables to a significant extent. The reaction function under inflation targeting in 
an open economy thus responds to more information, notably to foreign disturbances. The 
particular importance of the exchange rate for monetary policy rules in the case of emerging 
economies is also stressed by Amato and Gerlach (2002). 
Taylor (2001) argues that a monetary policy rule that reacts directly to the exchange 
rate, as well as to inflation and output, sometimes performs worse than policy rules that do not 
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react directly to the exchange rate and thereby avoid more erratic fluctuations in the interest 
rate. In Taylor (2002), however, he points out that monetary policy in open economies is 
different from that in closed economies. Open-economy policymakers seem averse to 
considerable variability in the exchange rate. In his view, they should target a measure of 
inflation that filters out the transitory effects of exchange rate fluctuations, and they should 
also include the exchange rate in their policy reaction functions.  
 
3. Methodology  
Following Taylor's (1993) seminal paper, it has become common to describe monetary 
policy by a linear feedback rule linking the interest rate to the output and inflation gap.  
 
***
tttt yri βαππ +++=  (1) 
where i is the short-term nominal interest rate set by the central bank, r* the assumed 
equilibrium real interest rate, π the actual rate of inflation, πt* the deviation of the actual 
inflation rate from the (central bank's) target rate and yt* the percent deviation of real GDP 
from its target, the output gap. The condition α>1, known as the Taylor principle, implies that 
the nominal interest rate is raised by more than one percentage point in response to an 
increase in inflation of one percentage point in order to increase real interest rates.  
In line with Taylor (2002), we apply a monetary policy rule for open economies, which 
takes into account the role of the exchange rate. We extend this approach and model the 
exchange rate component with two variables: Δst representing the growth rate of the exchange 
rate for the whole sample period, and bt, reflecting the exchange rates' position in the band, if 
the currency is pegged to an anchor currency.  
 tttttt bsyri γδβαππ +Δ++++= ***  (2) 
To model the impact of the exchange rate we thus use two different tools. For countries 
without explicit exchange rate targets, the growth rate of monthly exchange rates to the euro 
(before 1999: to the D-mark) is a proxy for the central banks desire to smooth exchange rate 
fluctuations.2  
                                                 
2
 We also included real and nominal effective exchange rates, this does, however, not substantially change the 
results. Using the exchange rates in levels (instead of growth rates) rather worsens the results. 
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For the countries with an explicit exchange rate target during the first subperiod, we also 
incorporate the band distance at which the market rates are located from either band edge.3 
This measure reflects pressure on the exchange rate, as every time the market rate approaches, 
or actually exceeds, one of the borders the central bank is obliged to react by interventions 
and/or interest rate changes4. Since one would expect a non-linear reaction – the closer the 
exchange rate approaches the intervention margins the stronger the central bank should react – 
we do not calculate the distance between the exchange rate and the closer edge, but transform 
the distance by an exponential function. As long as the exchange rate is inside the band (and 
far away from the edges) bt will be close to zero. However, bt grows exponentially as the 
market rate approaches the borders and even explodes when it has left the band. Moreover, 
the measure is signed, since the impact on the central bank’s interest rate policy is 
asymmetric. Thus, our band distance measure is: 
⎩
⎨
⎧ −
=
),slexp(
b ttt  
                                                      if  
                                                                                                                                               
                                                      if                                                     (3)   
 
with lt the lower boundary of the band (the strong edge), ut the upper boundary of the 
band (the weak edge) and st the exchange rate. The boundaries used for the calculation are the 
official bands set by the monetary authorities. In Figures 1-4, we show the evolution of the 
band distance variable over time, respectively for all the countries in our sample with a 
pegged exchange rate. Two interesting features stand out. First, the exchange rates often have 
had appreciating pressure and therefore, were close to the strong edge of the narrow bands. 
Second, the values increase dramatically during times of crises, when boundaries are reached 
or exceeded.  
Our band distance measure is closely related to the target zone models based on 
Krugman (1991). These models, such as described in Bartolini and Prati (1999), Crespo-
Cuaresma et al. (2005) or Fidrmuc and Horvath (2008), assume that monetary authorities do 
not intervene as long as the exchange rate is close to the central parity, but take policy actions 
                                                 
3
 The correlation between ∆st and bt turns out to be low and insignificant. 
4
 It is not unusual to add variables to capture certain pressures on the macroeconomic framework that could 
affect the parameters. For example, Cecchetti and Li (2008) add a measure of stress in the banking system to the 
original Taylor equation, which is quite close to our band distance variable. The rationale behind our band 
distance measure is thus similar, since it measures pressure emerging from the pegged exchange rate. 
=tb
)exp( tt sl −
)exp( tt us −−
tttt ussl −≤−
tttt ussl −>−
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when it is about to leave the band. However, while Krugman's target zone model describes the 
behaviour of the exchange rate, we focus on the policy actions themselves. 
We expect that monetary policy in CEEC should exhibit different coefficients over time, 
reflecting the evolution of exchange rate and monetary policy regimes: The initially tight 
exchange rate pegs should be reflected by a focus on the band distance, combined with a 
limited ability to directly target inflation. Schnabl (2008) demonstrates a strong link between 
exchange rate stability and growth rates for the CEEC during this episode, thus motivating 
policy actions beyond direct interventions on the exchange rate market. However, this initial 
setting should change when the pegs are abolished and the central banks divert their attention 
more on inflation. Nevertheless, some monitoring of the exchange rate may remain, which 
should be reflected by the smoothing element. The weight for output depends on the nature of 
the shocks and the room that the inflation target policy has left for any output goals. 
In our analysis we do not include the lagged interest rate as a smoothing component. 
Traditional explanations for smoothing interest rate changes include, for example, fear of 
disrupting capital markets, loss of credibility from sudden large policy reversals or the need 
for consensus building to support a policy change (Clarida et al., 1998). As this approach may 
rather entail an econometric solution in order to get meaningful results in an environment 
which suffers gravely from autocorrelation, we find it more appealing to confront these 
problems directly, in a generalized least squares framework. According to Rudebush (2002), 
the increase in predictability by adding lagged interest rates may indicate inconsistency 
between the rule and the data. 
Whereas the variables in the monetary policy rules are often treated as stationary, we 
follow Gerlach-Kristen (2003) and apply the cointegration methodology. Phillips (1986) 
claims that, if the variables are (nearly) integrated of order one, static regressions in levels are 
likely to produce spurious results. In this respect Rudebusch (2002) shows that such static 
regressions display an R-squared far larger than the Durbin Watson statistic, which may hint 
at a spurious regression. Therefore, results from monetary policy rules in levels are often 
regarded as doubtful (Carare et al. 2005). Gerlach-Kristen (2003) states that while interest 
rates, inflation gap and output gap are likely to be stationary in large samples, in order to draw 
correct statistical inference it is desirable to treat them as non stationary in relative short 
samples5. 
                                                 
5
 See also empirical work: Crespo Cuaresma et al. (2005) estimate a monetary model of the exchange rate for the 
same six CEEC as in our study from 1994-2002 using cointegration  In the same way Fidrmuc (2009) 
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We apply various unit root tests (Said and Dickey 1984, Kwiatkowski et al. 1992 and 
Perron 1989) to the data. The latter is less sensitive to structural breaks. The results suggest 
that interest and inflation rates are integrated of order one, whereas the output gap, the 
exchange rate growth and the band distance can be treated as stationary. However, any results 
should be carefully interpreted, taking into account that the sample size is small.  
For the cointegration analysis we include all variables, even the stationary ones. This 
has become common practice in the recent empirical literature (see e.g. Enders 2004, Asteriou 
and Hall 2007)6. We use the bounds testing approach by Pesaran et al. (2001) which explicitly 
allows for a mix of I(1) and I(0) variables as standard statistical inference based on 
conventional cointegration tests is no longer valid. First, the optimal lag length (p) is selected 
through the Akaike and Schwarz’ Bayesian information criteria. Because of the weight on the 
hypothesis of serially uncorrelated error terms for the legitimacy of the test, we set the p-value 
cautiously7. Next, we examine the null hypothesis of no cointegration using an F-statistic for 
the joint significance of the lagged level coefficients in the next equation (where c0 and c1t 
represent drift and trend elements and ξ is assumed to be white noise): 
 
 
 
If the F-value exceeds the upper bound this indicates the existence of a long run relation. 
However, if the F-value is smaller than the lower bound, we can not reject the null of no 
cointegration. Finally, a test statistic in between both critical values would leave us 
inconclusive (De Vita et al, 2004). Table 3 unravels the values of the bounds test and we 
retrieve a cointegration relation for all the countries in our sample8. 
In line with Gerlach-Kristen (2003), we do not estimate the full error-correction model, 
but instead focus on the single-equation approach discussed by Hamilton (1994).  
Even though cointegration yields results that are superconsistent, in small samples there 
may still occur a potential endogeneity bias. Hamilton postulates we can correct for this by 
                                                                                                                                                        
demonstrates for the same CEEC from 1994-2003 that money demand and all related variables are non-
stationary and thus again applies cointegration techniques. This is however less common for Taylor rules.  
6
 Lütkepohl (2004, p89) states: “Occasionally it is convenient to consider systems with both I(1) and I(0) 
variables. Thereby the concept of cointegration is extended by calling any linear combination that is I(0) a 
cointegration relation, although this terminology is not in the spirit of the original definition.”   
7
 When both criteria diverge, we retain the highest lag order. 
8
 We also apply the instrumental variable cointegration test by Enders et al. (2008), which is not only robust for 
stationary variables but also allows for dummy variables. This procedure confirms our results. 
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including past and future changes of the included variables. We get the following form of the 
Taylor rule (where we also include the disturbance term ηt): 
tktbkktskkt
k
ykktkttttt bsybsyci ηγδβπαγδβαπ π +Δ+Δ+Δ+Δ++Δ+++= +++
−=
+∑ )( 2
1
1
** (4) 
As the differences included in equation (4) only serve as a correction, we refer to the 
most important first part of the regression in what follows9. This analysis, similar to a 
dynamic OLS technique, is attributed to the seminal work of Stock and Watson (1993). 
Estimating equation (4) for the whole sample period is, however, meaningless, since the 
monetary policy rule is likely to substantially differ across subperiods. We therefore introduce 
dummy variables and allow for the coefficients to shift after the structural breaks, so that we 
can differentiate between the fixed and the flexible period. We also build in a dummy variable 
to catch any changes in the intercept. In this sense, the outer framework remains the same and 
the comparability between periods improves. The above tests for cointegration show that it is 
justified to use such a combined framework, because even though the parameters may have 
shifted over time, the variables involved still show a meaningful relation in the long run. This 
fragmentation of our sample in two separate periods gives us additional insight in the ‘fear of 
floating hypotheses’ (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002).  
The regime switches are defined as the dates when a narrow exchange rate band is 
widened to ±15% or completely abolished, according to the official exchange rate regime.10 
We regard a ±15% band as wide enough in order not to prevent a central bank from 
performing an autonomous monetary policy. This is in line with the observation that some of 
the countries (namely Hungary) announced inflation targeting in combination with such wide 
bands. The choice is also supported by the empirical observation that the band distance turns 
out to be close to zero for the periods with a ±15% band (see Figure 2). 
We thus determine the date of the regime switches by focusing on the exchange rate 
regime as given in table 2, instead of the monetary policy changes as given in table 111. This 
                                                 
9
 For achieving a unified framework and in line with Gerlach-Kristen (2003) we set the number of leads and lags 
of these elements to one. 
10
 We retrieve the following dates: For the Czech Republic we find 27/05/1997 (managed float), Hungary 
1/05/2001 (±15% band), Poland 25/03/1999 (±15% band) and Slovakia 1/10/1998 (managed float). 
11
 For example, Poland moved over from exchange rate targeting to inflation targeting in 1998, but only moved 
to a fifteen percent peg from March 1999 onwards. Nonetheless, our focus remains on the second date as the peg 
implies central bank intervention when the exchange rate violates one of its bands. Even though the focus of 
monetary policy seems to have switched to inflation, its hands may still be tied if it does not alter the peg. The 
same comment can be made for Slovakia. Although in both cases (we can conclude from our band distance 
variable that) the exchange rate troubles dwindled after the announcements of the new monetary policy. 
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is motivated by the crucial role the exchange rate arrangements played during the first part of 
the transition period. 
As Slovenia and Romania never announced any official fixed exchange rate 
arrangement we use the findings by Frömmel and Schobert (2006) and set the shift date for 
Romania to 31/12/1998. For Slovenia, we highlight a regime shift from implicit crawling 
band exchange rate regime before ERM2 membership to an explicit horizontal band. Due to 
the wide margins of the ERM2 we regard it as a shift to an (almost) floating exchange rate 
regime.  
Since we only distinguish between fixed and flexible exchange rates and since the de 
facto regime switches might differ from the official ones, we tested several alternative break 
points around our fixed date (but also on the basis of dates retrieved through the Quandt-
Andrews breakpoint test, which also lay in the vicinity of our previous date) and we can state 
that our framework remains largely robust to the modifications.12  
Through the above discussed changes, equation (4) evolves to 
 ttttttttt bssyydci γδδββπαπαψ +Δ+Δ++++++= 2211*22*11*22*11  (5)  
 tktbkktskkt
k
ykktk bsy ηγδβπαπ +Δ+Δ+Δ+Δ+ +++
−=
+∑ )( 2
1
1
 
where ψi is the dummy for the period i, with i=1 being the fixed exchange rate period, 
and i=2 the period with flexible exchange rate arrangement and (for most countries) inflation 
targeting. 
Finally, we use a GLS approach13 to correct the standards errors for autocorrelation and 
apply a White correction for heteroskedasticity (MacKinnon and White, 1985).  
 
4. Data and Estimation Results  
We analyze monthly data for the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia 
and Slovenia that covers the period between January 1994 and August 2008, thus leaving out 
the current financial crisis that may distort our results. Our sample includes data from the 
                                                 
12
 The results for these alternative dates and specifications can be retrieved from the authors 
13
 We prefer the method described in Johnston and Dinardo (1997), because it gives the possibility to set up a 
full GLS model, so we do not lose any observations compared to simply transforming the variables. Deeper 
analysis of the (partial) autocorrelation function of the residuals points towards a AR(1) structure. Besides the 
dynamic full GLS we also applied a simple OLS version and a transformed GLS estimation. The results, 
however, do not substantially differ. They are available from the authors on request. 
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IMF’s “International Financial Statistics” database, the OECD’s “statistical compendium”, 
and various central banks. 
For the interest rate we either implement the three month interbank rate or other money 
market rates depending on availability14.  
The inflation rate is calculated as the annual rate of change in the consumer price. 
Considering the inflation gap, one has to keep in mind that all of the investigated countries are 
involved in a European integration process. These countries thus have to apply a twin 
inflation target. They do not only face an internal target, which is set by the domestic central 
bank, but they also have to comply with an external target which is embedded in the 
Maastricht criteria. In many publications and statements of the CEECs' central banks a 
distinct focus on the inflation differential to EU countries can be observed. This strengthens 
our beliefs that the main attention should be on the inflation gap based on the Maastricht 
criterion. On a more empirical level this intuition is supported by Siklos (2006), with the 
external European target yielding more consistent results than its internal equivalent. 
Furthermore, there are several advantages in using the external criterion. First, not all of the 
countries adopted an inflation target for the whole period, thus there is only limited 
availability of internal inflation targets. Second, due to several reasons, e.g. the initially 
limited reputation of central banks or frequent changes in administered prices in CEEC or 
other shocks outside the control of the central bank, the official targets might substantially 
differ from the actual target or had to be adjusted over time. The Maastricht target, however, 
can be regarded as a medium to long-term objective, and therefore seems to be a more 
reasonable benchmark for inflation.  
The output gap is calculated based on industrial production using a Hodrick-Prescott 
filter (smoothing parameter 14400). The computation of the rate of potential output presents a 
difficult task (the same applies to the natural rate of unemployment). The results strongly 
depend on the way it has been conceived. If one assumes the original series to exhibit a 
deterministic trend, a filter is the most appropriate solution, while a stochastic trend demands 
differentiation of the variable. We follow the classical Taylor rule analysis and calculate the 
output gap based on a filter15. Although one may expect to retrieve better results using real-
                                                 
14
 More precisely, we incorporate the three months interbank rate for the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and 
Slovakia and the money market rate for Romania and Slovenia. As a robustness check, we also include various 
other short term interest rates in our analysis without any substantial change in the results. 
15
 In contrast some authors prefer to work with growth rates, although this may lead to over-differentiating 
(Siklos and Wohar 2005). We also estimated the model with growth rates. This does not affect the estimation 
output. The results are available from the authors on request.  
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time data (Orphanides 2001) this is not possible for our sample of countries, as internal 
estimates are either not available at all or not publicly available.16 
As a benchmark model, we first estimate equation (4) as a simple open economy 
framework with fixed parameters over time that serves as a benchmark model. The results are 
reported in the first column of each country-specific segment of Table 417. However, the 
interpretation demands caution as the coefficients will potentially be distorted and 
inconsistent due to the neglected structural break and the time-invariant coefficients. The long 
term reaction of the interest rate on inflation is above unity only for the Czech Republic and 
Slovenia, and at least not significantly different from 1 for Hungary. So broadly speaking, we 
can say that three countries satisfy the Taylor principle.18 The coefficient for output seems 
less convincing as only Slovenia has a significant, but counterintuitive sign. The minor role 
for output in the CEEC's monetary policy also corroborates with e.g. Vonnák (2007) and 
Jakab et al. (2006) who state that (Hungarian) monetary policy has a rather limited effect on 
output. 
The same applies for the exchange rate growth element, which solely gives meaningful 
results for the Czech Republic. The parameter which seems significant over all the (fixed 
exchange rate) countries is the band distance coefficient (although for the Czech Republic this 
holds for a higher level of significance). This preliminary setting already depicts a relatively 
realistic picture of the monetary policy stance.19 Only the equation for Slovakia does not seem 
to be quite stable. 
As a second step, we add the dummy intercept and slice up the variables to mimic both 
periods more truthfully, thus estimating equation (5). The results are reported in the second 
column of each country-specific section in Table 4. It is interesting to portrait the regime 
dependence in the components and intercept dummies and their overall impact (this applies 
for all countries except Slovenia, where the shift reflects a different episode).   
There is a substantial change in the sliced up coefficients. These differences are most 
obvious for the inflation coefficient. The number of countries satisfying the Taylor principle 
rises remarkably in the second period (inflation targeting and flexible exchange rate). This 
pattern corresponds to our expectations that the central banks had more flexibility to monitor 
                                                 
16
 We also tested various specifications based on unemployment rates (both with HP-filter and MA-gap). This 
did, however, not affect the results. The estimation output is available form the authors. 
17
 The constants are not reported as they are not easily interpretable in the cointegration based version of the 
Taylor rule and serve as an “auxiliary variable” (Gerlach-Kristen, 2003). 
18
 However, the coefficient is uniformly smaller than 1.5, which is often taken as a benchmark measure. 
19
 The Durbin-Watson statistic and the Breusch-Godfrey (BG) test indicate that the residuals do not show 
remaining autocorelation.  
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the inflation target during the second period. Moreover, the band distance element seems 
quite robust for the new specification and is unambiguously significant for the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia during their fixed exchange rate regimes. In contrast, 
the exchange rate changes Δst are not significant for all countries but Slovakia. Thus, central 
banks used the interest rate instrument in order to keep the exchange rate well inside officially 
announced bands, but they hardly used this instrument in order to smooth exchange rate 
fluctuations. These relatively high coefficients for inflation during the flexible period also are 
in contrast with past studies on the same or similar countries, which find insignificant or low 
values for inflation. This is in line with the argument by Angeloni et al. (2008) that in a 
Taylor rule the reaction to inflation is partially captured by other variables, in our case the 
band distance.  
Similarly, there are some alternations over time for the coefficients of the output gap 
and the exchange rate growth. But the importance of these particular elements generally 
seems to be quite low over both periods.  
As an intermediate summary, we can conclude that the interest rate setting behaviour of 
the respective central banks only paid attention to the exchange rate during periods of 
officially fixed regimes. This consideration of the exchange rate is best embodied through the 
band distance. During periods of officially floating exchange rates, central banks increasingly 
took a more inflation minded approach. Slovakia is an exception as the coefficient on 
exchange rate growth is significant during its more flexible exchange rate regime. On a more 
empirical level, we can also state that the new specification raises the explanatory power for 
all the countries: The adjusted R-squared is comparable to specifications including the lagged 
interest rate. Therefore we can assume that our specification gives a more realistic fit of the 
monetary policy rules for these transition countries.  
We add alternative specifications to the equations in order to include country-specific 
features, and in order to conduct some robustness checks. These results are listed in table 5. 
For the Czech Republic we build in an extra crisis dummy for the turbulent period in 
June1997. The results show that both inflation coefficients become significant, and there is 
still a substantial rise. Moreover, the second period's exchange rate component is now 
correctly signed. Finally, the band distance element remains robust and for the output values 
there is little change. All of these changes cause a higher adjusted R-squared, suggesting that 
this may be a more accurate description. 
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Since in the case of Hungary and Poland the introduction of inflation targeting and the 
abolishment of the peg did not coincide, these countries require additional considerations. We 
test a different break date (based on the Andrews-Quandt test) for Hungary. The intuition 
behind this is that we now set the date endogenously through our data instead of imposing it 
externally20. The new break date becomes June 1999, which is comparatively earlier than the 
official date. Furthermore, we see a more distinct change in the inflation parameters, although 
they both remain significantly indifferent from unity.     
For Poland we estimate an alternative specification to assert what happens if we let our 
observations for the band distance run through for a longer period (than the officially stated 
pegged period which ends in April 2000) as we have indications that the monitoring of the 
peg went on a bit longer. Remarkably, the band distance coefficient seems robust and remains 
significant.  
Romania never explicitly announced an exchange rate policy, so no official break date is 
available. Nevertheless, there are good reasons to assume that a break occurred in December 
of 1998. The inflation coefficient increases for the later period.21  
For Slovakia the estimation results improve with the specification allowing for the 
structural break, however, they remain comparatively unstable. Although the band distance 
element satisfies our expectations, we can not find any realistic inflation coefficients and the 
adjusted R-squared is relatively low. The specification may therefore be unfit to realistically 
model the Slovakian data. When we add a band distance element specific for the ERM2 
period to the regression, this variable is almost zero (reflected by the insignificant coefficient 
for γ2B in table 5), which could either be due to the absence of pressure on the Slovak koruna 
during this period or due to changes of the central parity at times of pressure. In fact, the later 
case is more likely as the central parity of the Slovak koruna was revalued twice during its 
ERM2 membership, and thus relieved pressures from the exchange rate from hitting the 
strong edge of the band. 
The Slovenian authorities officially announced a managed floating exchange rate regime 
for the whole period before ERM2 membership. As there was no explicit change in the 
exchange rate regime, the specification with breaks would not add any value for this episode. 
In contrast, we uncover (and model) a policy switch when the Slovenian currency joins the 
ERM2-system. Officially, this was a change from a managed floating regime towards a 
                                                 
20
 We did this check for all the countries, but only report the results in case of a considerable effect. 
21
 For checking the robustness we shortened the sample period. This does not affect the results. 
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comparatively flexible peg to the euro with very wide bands. Implicitly, however, it was a 
more pronounced policy shift from a de facto crawling band.22 As an alternative specification, 
we turn our attention to the fact that Slovenia's monetary policy, in contrast to the other 
countries in the sample, officially focused on monetary aggregates. Until 1997 the focus was 
mainly on base money and M1, but later it switched to M3 (and in 2001 Slovenia even 
adopted a two pillar strategy). We build in these subperiods with several dummy variables 
and come to the following conclusion: The inflation coefficient is relatively stable over all 
periods, the output coefficients become significant but are wrongly signed and the coefficient 
of the money gap23 is only significant in the third period. Consequently, we can not retrieve 
the policy attention for monetary aggregates as it was officially stated. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Many central banks in emerging market economies may pay special attention to 
exchange rate movements, even though they do not officially claim to target the exchange 
rate. In order to influence exchange rate developments the central bank can basically use two 
instruments: foreign exchange interventions and interest rate changes. We focus on the later 
monetary policy instrument by estimating open-economy monetary policy rules, in order to 
analyse to which extent central banks in Central and Eastern Europe have given the exchange 
rate a special role in their interest rate decisions.  
We estimate monetary policy rules based on a cointegration approach and explicitly take 
into consideration shifts in exchange rate regimes. The influence of the exchange rate on the 
interest rate setting behaviour of central banks in CEEC differs strongly between regimes. 
During periods of more rigid exchange rate arrangements the influence of the exchange rate 
dominates, i.e. the interest rate policy is mainly influenced by the distance to the intervention 
margins on which the central bank has to react in order to keep the peg working. During the 
time periods of more flexible exchange rate arrangements we find a stronger focus on 
inflation, namely, on the deviation of domestic inflation from the inflation rate set by the 
Maastricht criterion. This is, in particular, the case for the Czech Republic, Poland and 
Romania. The inflation coefficient for Slovenia also satisfies the Taylor principle, whereas for 
Hungary the coefficient is below, but not significantly different from unity.  
                                                 
22
 The band distance variable in this setting only applies for the ERM2-period. Since the exchange rate during 
did not move close to the margins, the band distance values are negligible and were thus not included in the 
estimation. 
23
 We also included money growth rates as an alternative, but this does not substantially alter the estimation 
output. 
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Slovakia remains a special case in the sample. The inflation coefficients do not satisfy 
the Taylor principle, and it seems that there has been an ongoing focus on exchange rate 
movements after switching from a fixed exchange rate regime to a managed float. The interest 
rate setting behaviour indicates an implicit peg, while the two revaluations of the central 
parity also indicate the challenges to the implicit peg during ERM2-membership.  
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FIGURES 1-4: Derivation of the band distance element from the historical exchange rate peg values. In the upper segment of each graph, the solid black 
lines represent the strong and weak edge, the gray line denotes the central parity and the market rate is given by the dotted line. In the lower segment, we 
depict the band distance. 
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Tables: 
TABLE 1: Official Monetary Policy Strategies for Central and Eastern European Countries 
Czech Republic Hungary Poland 
1994-1997 Exchange rate and 
monetary targeting 
(credit volume and 
M2) 
1994-2002 Exchange rate 
targeting 
1994-1998 Exchange rate 
targeting  
1998-2001 Net inflation1 
targeting  
2002- Inflation targeting 
(CPI annual 
average)3 
1998- Inflation targeting 
(end of year CPI 
inflation) 
2002- Headline inflation 
targeting with linear 
and declining target 
band 
    
      
Romania Slovakia Slovenia 
1994-
7/2005 
No official 
commitment to a 
monetary policy 
strategy 
1994-1998 Exchange rate 
targeting 
1994-1995 Base money 
targeting 
8/2005-
2008 
Inflation targeting 1998-2008 Informal inflation 
targeting 
1996 Base money and 
M1-targeting 
  11/2005 – 
12/2008 
2009- 
ERM-II 
 
Euro system 
1997-2000 M3-targeting2 
    2001-2006 Two-pillar strategy4 
    06/2004 – 
12/2006 
2007- 
ERM-II 
 
Euro system 
1
  Headline inflation minus regulated prices and changes in indirect taxes 
2
  In Slovenia also including foreign exchange deposits of private households 
3
  Exchange rate targeting continues in a wide band (±15%) 
4
  Similar to the strategy of the European Central Bank the Bank of Slovenia bases its monetary policy indicators on two 
pillars, i.e. indicators of liquidity, and other economic indicators. 
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TABLE 2: Official Exchange Arrangements for Central and Eastern European Countries 
Czech Republic Hungary Poland 
01/01/1994-
29/02/1996 
Basket peg, 
65% DEM, 
35%USD, 
Band: ±0.5% 
01/01/1994-
31/12/1996 
Crawling peg1,  
70% Ecu, 
30% USD, 
Band: ±2.25% 
01/01/1994-
15/05/1995 
Crawling peg,  
45% USD, 35% 
DEM, 10% 
GBP,  
5% FRF,  
5% CHF 
Band: ±1 % 
01/03/1996-
26/05/1997 
Band: ±7.5% 01/01/1997-
31/12/1999 
70% DEM, 
30% USD 
16/05/1995-
24/02/1998 
Band: ±7% 
27/05/1997-
present 
Managed float 01/01/2000-
30/04/2001 
100% EUR 25/02/1998-
31/12/1998 
Band: ±10% 
  01/05/2001-
30/09/2001 
Band: ±15% 01/01/1999-
11/04/2000 
45% USD, 
55% EUR 
  01/10/2001-
25/02/2008 
Peg to EUR, 
Band: ±15% 
12/04/2000-
present 
Free float 
  26/02/2008-
present 
Managed float   
Romania Slovak Republic Slovenia 
since 01/01/1994 Managed float 
 
01/01/1994-
31/12/1996 
Basket peg, 
60% DEM, 
40%USD, 
Band: ±1.5% 
01/01/1994-
26/06/2004 
Managed float 
  01/01/1997-
30/09/1998 
Band: ±7% 27/06/2004-
31/12/2006 
ERM2 
  01/10/1998-
24/11/2005 
Managed float since 01/01/2007 Euro Area 
Member 
  25/11/2005-
31/12/2008 
ERM2   
  since 01/01/2009 Euro Area 
Member 
  
Source: IMF, Annual Report of Exchange Rate Arrangements and Restrictions, various issues 
1
 Until 16.3.1995, the NBH devalued in discrete steps 
 
TABLE 3: Bounds Testing Approach for Cointegration 
Country   
Optimal Lag 
Length   
F- 
Statistic   
Lower 
Bound   
Upper 
Bound 
         
Czech Republic  1  4.522  3.120  4.250 
         
Hungary  5  4.620  3.120  4.250 
         
Poland  1  4.507  3.120  4.250 
         
Romania  6  5.274  3.470  4.570 
         
Slovakia  3  5.189  3.120  4.250 
         
Slovenia   4   4.996   3.470   4.570 
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TABLE 4: Estimates of the cointegrating vector 
  Czech Republic  Hungary  Poland  Romania  Slovakia  Slovenia 
Coefficients 
Time-
invariant 
Structural 
Break  
Time-
invariant
Structural 
Break  
Time-
invariant
Structural 
Break  
Time-
invariant 
Structural 
Break  
Time-
invariant 
Structural 
Break  
Time-
invariant 
Structural 
Break 
α
 π α1 π 1.133 -0.120  0.878 0.868  0.685 0.555  0.324 0.118  0.239 0.316  1.306 1.453 
  (0.000) (0.805)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.002) (0.157)  (0.125) (0.527)  (0.000) (0.000) 
 α2 π - 1.021  - 0.903  - 1.134  - 1.120  - 0.344  - 1.050 
  - (0.000)  - (0.000)  - (0.000)  - (0.000)  - (0.002)  - (0.059) 
β
 Y β1Y  -0.199 -0.093  -0.121 -0.194  0.031 0.058  -0.251 -0.940  0.303 0.118  -0.526 -0.592 
  (0.133) (0.342)  (0.119) (0.007)  (0.666) (0.505)  (0.378) (0.150)  (0.352) (0.666)  (0.001) (0.000) 
 β2Y - -0.331  - -0.108  - 0.060  - -0.006  - -0.160  - -0.430 
  - (0.018)  - (0.170)  - (0.465)  - (0.981)  - (0.478)  - (0.008) 
γB γB 1.628 2.619  1.072 1.695  1.325 1.381  - -  3.636 5.908  - - 
  (0.085) (0.007)  (0.032) (0.000)  (0.004) (0.008)  - -  (0.033) (0.001)  - - 
δ
 S δ1S 0.338 0.285  0.120 0.152  -0.015 -0.015  -0.506 0.906  1.002 1.208  0.8324 1.443 
  (0.035) (0.137)  (0.203) (0.489)  (0.044) (0.307)  (0.000) (0.554)  (0.207) (0.163)  (0.403) (0.109) 
 δ2S  - 0.243  - 0.095  - -0.000  - -0.380  - 1.245  - -3.462 
  - (0.210)  - (0.418)  - (0.999)  - (0.093)  - (0.037)  - (0.222) 
 ψD - -9.741  - -1.811  - -6.091  - -53.466  - -7.002  - 3.318 
  - (0.017)  - (0.034)  - (0.000)  - (0.000)  - (0.050)  - (0.001) 
R2adj  0.545 0.653  0.771 0.858  0.613 0.819  0.391 0.531  0.093 0.232  0.576 0.673 
DW  1.860 1.759  1.454 1.300  1.313 0.909  1.402 1.245  2.170 1.882  2.234 2.135 
"Time-invariant" is the estimate for the benchmark equation (4)
tktbkktskktyk
l
k ktkttttt
bsybsyci ηγδβπαγδβαπ π +Δ+Δ+Δ+Δ++Δ+++= +++
−=
+∑ )( 21
**
, "Structural Breaks" for 
equation (5) with regime-dependent coefficients: 
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We employ the following break dates: the Czech Republic (27/05/1997), Hungary (1/05/2001), Poland (25/03/1999), Romania (31/12/1998), Slovakia (1/10/1998) and Slovenia (27/06/2004). All of 
these represent a move into more “flexible arrangements, except for Slovenia (ERM2). P-values in parenthesis. Estimates of the auxiliary coefficient c not reported.
  
 25
TABLE 5: Estimates of the cointegrating vector for alternative specifications  
  Czech R.   Hungary   Poland   Romania     Slovakia     Slovenia 
α1 π 0.799  0.772  0.528  0.100  α1 π 0,298  α1 π 1.295 
 (0.005)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.187)   (0,548)   (0.000) 
α2 π 1.115  0.967  1.057  0.983  α2 π 0,350  α2 π 1.083 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)   (0,001)   (0.002) 
β1Y  -0.125  -0.053  0.026  -1.030  β1Y  0,110  β1Y  -0.628 
 (0.144)  (0.591)  (0.774)  (0.106)   (0,682)   (0.000) 
β2Y -0.166  -0.123  0.063  0.082  β2Y -0,171  β2Y -0.412 
 (0.024)  (0.151)  (0.464)  (0.588)   (0,443)   (0.005) 
γB 1.006  1.085  1.301  -  γ1B 5,973  δ1S 1.196 
 (0.041)  (0.014)  (0.009)  -   (0,000)   (0.292) 
δ1S 0.167  0.168  -0.103  -0.526  γ2B -0,306  δ2S  0.259 
 (0.320)  (0.350)  (0.001)  (0.000)   (0,895)   (0.929) 
δ2S  0.251  0.137  -0.107  0.324  δ1S 1,225  σ 1M -0.395 
 (0.043)  (0.177)  (0.010)  (0.352)   (0,158)   (0.432) 
ψD  -1.361  -3.561  -6.683  -58.762  δ2S  1,264  σ 2M 0.278 
 (0.043)  (0.003)  (0.000)  (0.000)   (0,037)   (0.179) 
ψ'D  9.742  -  -  -  ψD  -7,184  σ 3M -0.219 
 (0.000)  -  -  -   (0,040)   (0.008) 
R2adj 0.708  0.849  0.814  0.581  R2adj 0,239  R2adj 0.683 
DW 0.899   1.434   0.933   1.396   DW 1,860   DW 2.052 
P-values in parenthesis. Estimates of the auxiliary coefficient c not reported. We add a crisis dummy in the equation for the Czech Republic: 
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We opt for the classical structure of equation (5) for Hungary, Poland and Romania, but with their country-specific characteristics. Break date adjustments for Hungary (01/06/1999) and Romania 
(1/12/1998), otherwise this date complies with the information in table 4. In Poland we examine the length of the band distance. 
The Slovakian estimation also incorporates bands for ERM2: 
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Finally, for Slovenian we add monetary variables: 
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We estimate monetary policy rules for six central and eastern European 
countries. 
We take changes in the policy settings explicitly into account. 
The exchange rate impact is split up into two different components. 
In contrast to most empirical work our estimates satisfy the Taylor principle. 
The focus in most countries switched from defending the peg to targeting 
inflation. 
